Mobility is one of the most important features in users' communications. The increasing progress carried out by mobile communications has changed the concept of mobile phone. Nowadays, each new device offers newer technologies and services adapted to user requirements. However, each added improvement has a set of threats, which have to be taken into account for ensuring the confidentiality, integrity and availability of user and system data.
INTRODUCTION
The progress carried out by mobile phone manufacturers is a present reality, and theirs trends are growing as the days go by. Furthermore, this evolution has some advantages like newer features adapted to current user requirements. However, it also implies some difficulties, which have to be taken into account, such as the creation of a trustworthy mobile platform, which ensures user privacy and security. The trustworthiness of these systems must check the three main features on any computer security: confidentiality, integrity and availability. However, ensuring user privacy is a difficult task, which has to be carried out throughout the software lifecycle, from analysis to development stage. For this reason, mobile manufacturers have created security divisions for implemented platforms, which protect users from different attacks. But all these security mechanisms are not completely effective, either because of the effort that it implies or simply due to design failures. The goal of this study is to analyze and evaluate the trustworthiness of some important mobile security platforms. The rest of this paper is divided into three sections: the first one depicts an analysis of some relevant mobile security platforms such as Symbian, Windows Mobile and iPhone OS. Then, the second section uses these obtained results for describing an evaluation process, which sums up with some positive and negative aspects of each studied platform. Finally, the third part finishes with some final conclusions obtained from the evaluation process.
MOBILE SECURITY PLATFORM ANALYSIS
The wide mobile security range includes several types of mobile operating systems. Each one has its own features and examples, described below (Heath, 2006) : Open Platforms enable the access to native interfaces, and usually provide an SDK (Software Development Kit) for accessing to these interfaces and, develop third-party applications. Despite all these advantages, these systems are the most vulnerable due to the wide range of access to system capabilities and, for that reason, are the main target of any attacker. 
Symbian OS
Currently, Symbian OS (Symbian, 2009 ) is the most known and used operating system on the mobile market. Symbian OS is a single-user and multitask operating system with EKA2 (EPOC Kernel Architecture 32bits) architecture and some specific features (Savoldi and Gubian, 2008) : Modularity. RTOS (Real-time Operating System) nanokernel. Priority-based pre-emptive multitask. Single-user feature reduces considerably the complexity of security platform, achieving a lightweight platform, which satisfies common mobile restrictions, such as effectiveness and efficiency. Furthermore, the security policies used on these systems are based on capabilities list. The following list enumerates some rules, which set up the basis of Symbian OS security platform.
Each process must have resources and access privileges list, which allow the access to some system capabilities, which are invariants during their execution. Each process must have its own virtual address space protected by the operating system. Each application signature gives access to only one system capability, although the operating system allows multiple signed applications. Each process can only use shared libraries (DLL, Dynamic Load Library) with at least the same level of trust. Figure 1 TCB is the core component of the security platform and so, the most trusted part, which controls the lowest level of security mechanisms. It includes the components described below. Kernel: Assign privileges on process creation. File Server (F32): Load program code on process creation. Software Installer (SWInstall): Install SIS (Symbian OS Install Script) files, including software validation. TCE consists of a set of servers with specific features. Each server is independent from the rest, and needs a set of specific privileges to access it. Signed software is a set of trusted applications which have enough rights to access TCE interfaces, and unsigned software is a set of untrusted applications which does not have rights to access TCE interfaces. Symbian OS capabilities are a set of privileges installed on the system. In particular, it has twenty capabilities divided into three groups: TCB, user and system. Finally, the last component of the Symbian OS security platform is the data caging, which is used to protect the integrity and confidentiality of the system. There are three special containers protected by data caging: \sys, \resource and \private. Figure 2 describes the process followed by the security platform on most of the software installation process. Firstly, SWInstall verifies the presence of signatures in the application. If so, TCB and TCE enumerate the signature or signatures and then, classify them into the different system servers. If not, the application is unsigned, so it will not have privileges. 
Windows Mobile
Windows Mobile (Microsoft, 2009 (Personal Digital Assistant) and Classic SDK for PDAs with no phone. Taking this disposition into account, this security platform is the sum of a set of security policies, roles and certificates. Windows Mobile supports three different types of security policies defined on system registry (HKLM\Security\Policies\Policies), which set up the access permissions to the file system (Microsoft, 2007) (Moreno, 2008) :
Privileged or Kernel Mode. It allows read and write access to the file system. Normal or User Mode. It allows full access to personal data areas and denies access to protected zones. Blocked. No access at all. Security roles are the components responsible to manage access to system resources, and it is especially used for provisioning purposes. Furthermore, certificate management is one of the most important features because it provides confidentiality to user data and manages the execution of an application and the assignation of its respective access rights. All certificates are saved on certificates stores, each one with different privileges and access rights. Finally, Windows Mobile defines five security levels, which are listed below (Microsoft, 2007) (Moreno, 2008) :
Security Off (only for testing purposes). One-tier prompt (see Figure 3) . Two-tier prompt (see Figure 4) . Mobile2Market locked. Locked. Figure 3 shows the installation process followed by the one-tier security platform. This type of security platform is used on the Professional SDK and the Classic SDK. Firstly, the certificate manager checks for presence of certificates in the application. If certificates cannot be found, it will apply security policies for unsigned applications, elsewhere certificates get validated. It will apply privileged mode capabilities if the certificate is known, otherwise it will apply security policies for unknown certificates. Figure 4 shows the installation process followed by the two-tier security platform. This type of security platform is used on the Standard SDK. This procedure is analogous to the one-tier installation process, but instead of assigning privileged mode capabilities for known certificates, it assigns permissions according to the certificates store. CFNetwork is the component responsible for establishing secure communications between iPhone and any external device connected to Internet throughout TCP/IP by using protocols such as SSL (Secure Socket Layer) or TLS (Transport Secure Layer). Keychain services are responsible for keeping secure user and system data storage by ensuring the confidentiality, integrity and availability. These features are based on encryption/decryption interfaces and certificate management. Its usage is very important: it protects the personal data from any possible attacker. However, the access to keychain services and root certificates management are driven by the iPhone OS security server daemon. For security reasons, the daemon API (Application Program Interface) is not accessible to software developers. Sandboxing services are a fine-grained access control system whose main task is to protect the resources of the system. This type of system is implemented with MAC (Mandatory Access Control) and every installed application is inside of a sandbox environment. Therefore, with this security countermeasure, the file system is protected against some attacks, or misuse. However, there are some other attacks, such as buffer/heap overflow, which can avoid this restriction and it is responsibility of the application designer to create secure applications, which protect this type of attacks or malicious applications (Zdziarski, 2008) (Miller et al., 2007) . Figure 6 describes the steps followed by the iPhone OS security platform during the installation of a third-party application. Firstly, the certificate manager and the keychain manager checks for presence of certificates into the application. If so, the installation process will finish inside of a sandbox environment if the keychain manager validates the existing certificate, otherwise the installation process will fail. Finally, the last security feature is a simple data caging procedure. The disk drive is divided into two partitions, and one of them contains the kernel file system with read-only permissions. Therefore, this countermeasure protects the file system from malicious attacks.
iPhone OS

MOBILE SECURITY PLATFORM ASSESSMENT
In the previous section, three of the most important mobile security platforms were analyzed for better understanding of the topics discussed below. This section will define the most known vulnerabilities and weaknesses of these operating systems by using the following methodology schema: Implementation 
Symbian OS
Nowadays, Symbian OS is considered the most attacked operating system on the market, followed by far by Windows Mobile (Heath, 2006) . This experience is translated into a robust security platform with a really small number of vulnerabilities. Implementation failures, also known as bugs, are one of the most important loopholes in any operating system. However, the wide range of this attack vector exceeds the scope of this assessment, and it will only analyze file system and native application failures, which have been considered the most relevant and harmful inside of a mobile phone. Currently, the number of known Symbian OS implementation vulnerabilities is really small or non-existent. Communications failures are the most recent loopholes in any operating system, because the growing evolution of the mobile phones involves the creation of weak communications protocols adapted to user requirements. Bluetooth and MMS failures are the most known Symbian OS failures, but they need to use social engineering techniques for exploiting the mobile phone. The problem of the social engineering techniques is that the mobile phone user carries all the liability and the security platform cannot perform any countermeasure. 
Windows Mobile
Windows Mobile is nowadays one of the most important mobile operating systems. This importance is due to Microsoft Windows predominance on the computer market and the current growing number of devices with this platform.
File system failures are the most dangerous case of implementation failures because their presence are extended to all mobile phones with the involved operating system, but they are also the most costeffective to fix because only one patch release can be applied to all the involved operating systems. A sample of this type of vulnerability is described below: Bypassing the code-signing protection in Windows Mobile is relatively easy because, once a mobile phone user accepts the installation of a normal application, provided by Visual Studio but used with malicious purposes (SDKCerts.cab), any installed application signed with a special certificate (SDKSamplePrivDeveloper.spc) will have full privileges (Moreno, 2008) . Native applications failures are the existing implementation failures in each system application and excluding third-party applications. These failures are less dangerous than the previous type, but the profitability to fix these failures will depend on the number of existing application instances. If a majority uses an application, the released patch will be cost-effective. Some samples of these failures are the numerous cases of denial of service in ActiveSync and PIE (Pocket Internet Explorer) (Dunham, 2009) . Bluetooth and MMS (Bluetooth, 2009) (MMS, 2003) are considered one of the main communication failures in any operating system, but in fact, it is commonly used for spreading malicious applications. However, Bluetooth is vulnerable to driver-level attacks and BD_ADDR Spoofing attacks (Moreno, 2009) 
iPhone OS
As we discuss in the previous section, iPhone OS is a single-user operating system. However, the only system user is the root account and all the applications are running with no restrictions. Implementation failures are the only existing failures in the iPhone OS, because the communications protocols are very restrictive and theirs user interfaces are too limited. Currently the most known implementation failures are the file system failures and they are described below (Zdziarski, 2008) . Root account involves that any system failure or malicious application instantly gets a privileged mode. For this reason, Apple Inc. restricts extremely the third-party installation process. Static addressing means that all the application instances have the same memory address, instead of the randomization methods used in the majority of mobile operating systems. Static systems means that currently, there are only two phone models of Apple iPhone based on the same hardware and software. This feature is useful for an attacker because all the malicious programs will have the same pattern. Finally, earlier firmware versions of the iPhone OS (1.1.4 -2.0) had some native applications failures in the Safari WebKit interfaces. These failures exploit the mobile phone with denial of service attacks.
CONCLUSIONS
The obtained conclusions from this study show that the maturity of the operating systems is a relevant point to take into account because it is inversely proportional to the number of vulnerabilities and therefore, it can be used such as a security estimator. As we discuss in the previous section, Symbian OS is the most attacked platform and it has the smaller number of vulnerabilities. In fact, Symbian OS has the most secure execution procedures, followed closely by Windows Mobile. Moreover, both platforms have a normal level of security on installation procedures based on code-signing and certificates management. On the other hand, iPhone OS is the least secure operating system because their execution procedures are too permissive, and these techniques waste all security efforts placed on the installation procedures. Finally, Table 1 shows a resume of the main differences between each studied security platform. In future works, we are going to research about advanced methodologies, which enable the automatic security assessment of any mobile operating system. In addition, to improve the existing procedures, we will research on different mobile malware classification techniques. 
